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Abstract:  
The 2014 European elections confirmed the prominence in the media of what is commonly called 
the far right. While parties such as the Front National and UKIP were successful in the elections, their 
performance has since been exaggerated and they have benefited from a disproportionate 
coverage. Aiding their apparently ‘irresistible rise’, their normalisation was greatly facilitated by their 
description as ‘populist’ parties. However, while this term ‘populism’ has been almost universally 
accepted in the media, it remains a hotly debated concept on the academic circuit, and its careless 
use could in fact prove counterproductive in the assessment of the current state of democracy in 
Europe. 
 
Instead of focusing on the reasons behind the rise of these parties, similarities and differences 
already widely covered in the literature, this article hypothesises that a skewed and disproportionate 
coverage of the European elections in particular, and the ‘rise’ of ‘right-wing populism’ in general, 
have prevented a thorough democratic discussion from taking place and impeded the possibility of 
other political alternatives.  
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Populism, the people and the illusion of democracy 
Casting a blank vote is your irrevocable right, and no one will ever deny you that 
right, but, just as we tell children not to play with matches, so we warn whole 
peoples of the dangers of playing with dynamite (Saramago, 2006: 83-86). 
Politics is not made up of power relationships; it is made up of relationships between 
worlds (Rancière, 1995: 67). 
Media coverage of populist nativist parties (PNPs) is on the rise across Europe. While they have 
witnessed various levels of support, their impact on European politics in the early twenty-first 
century is undeniable. In the recent European elections, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), 
the French Front National (FN), the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
performed particularly well, with the latter three winning in their respective countries. In contrast, in 
the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) and in Belgium the Vlaams Belang (VB) 
suffered unexpected setbacks (see tables 1 and 2). Despite their mixed fortune, the media was quick 
to talk about democratic ‘earthquakes’ and ‘tsunamis’, with the New York Times headlining 
‘Populists' Rise in Europe Vote Shakes Leaders’ (Higgins, 26 May 2014). While the term ‘populism’ 
has been almost universally accepted in the media to describe parties such as the FN and UKIP, and 
even more extreme cases such as Greece’s Chrysí Avgí (GD) and Hungary’s Jobbik (J), it remains a 
hotly debated concept within academic circles. While opposition to immigration has always been 
considered an essential feature of extreme right parties (Hainsworth, 2008: 70-77), their populist 
characteristic has led to much discussion and misinterpretation, be it conscious or unconscious. It is 
such (mis)characterisations that this article will discuss rather than the reasons behind the rise of 
these parties, already widely covered in the literature. The primary aim of this paper is to explore 
the specious nature of PNPs' relationship to 'the people'. By studying the manipulation of this myth 
within elite discourse, this article will highlight various ways in which this process serves to 
undermine democracy. This article presents an overview of a wider debate and underlines the 
significance of the relationship between misconceptions of populism and a wider democratic 
malaise. The hypotheses tested here are part of a broader research project relying on mixed 
research methods; in particular on discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), critical discourse 
analysis and content analysis of elite discourse (Fairclough, 1995; Van Dijk, 2001; Wodak and Meyer, 
2001); as well as secondary poll analysis. This article provides the context and theoretical 
underpinning for the project and highlights the questions key to a radically new understanding of 
liberal democracy in Europe; it is therefore based primarily on the analysis of secondary sources. 
Ultimately, the aim of this research is to examine the reaction the rise of PNPs has triggered within 
mainstream elite circles (the media, academia and the political class). Its main hypothesis will sustain 
that a skewed and disproportionate coverage of the European elections, and the ‘rise’ of ‘right-wing 
populism’ in general, have prevented a thorough democratic debate from taking place. 
While this article discusses the impact of PNPs across western Europe, examples to illustrate the 
theory will be drawn from France and the United Kingdom. This choice was carefully weighed and 
uncovers some valuable findings. These countries were selected because of the prominence of 
parties with populist nativist agendas, who each ‘won’ the European elections despite their rejection 
by mainstream opponents, but also because of the different trajectories taken by these parties to 
achieve such prominence. The FN was born out of a neo-fascist alliance in the 1970s, and has strived 
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to gain legitimacy since then, achieving its most convincing results once its leadership was polished; 
UKIP took the opposite path, moving away from its conservative, academic and elitist origins, to a 
more populist, traditional radical right platform and discourse.1 The study of the conceptualisation of 
both parties provides useful insights into the impact the rise of populism has had on liberal 
democracies, and the democratic debate in general. 
Essential for a study of this type, the article first outlines a clear and precise definition of PNPs. The 
second part deals with the ‘rise’ of PNPs and its mediatisation, while the final part broadens the field 
of research to evaluate whether PNPs may only be one of the symptoms of a deeper malaise 
currently affecting established liberal democracies. 
Populist Nativist parties 
Francisco Panizza (2005: 1) declared that ‘it has become almost a cliché to start writing on populism 
by lamenting the lack of clarity about the concept and casting doubts about its usefulness for 
political analysis’. In 2005, Cas Mudde (2007: 12) counted over 23 different names to describe such 
parties. Ten years on, the debate is still open, and while some classifications are more popular than 
others, their usefulness and accuracy are often limited, or at best debatable. Such a definitional 
mess is key to understanding the impact of parties like the FN and UKIP. For the purpose of the 
present research, the term ‘populist nativist parties’ has been deemed most appropriate for reasons 
which will become clearer as the argument develops. This is not to say that other terms such as 
‘radical right’ or ‘extreme right’ could not have been applied to the parties discussed in this article, 
but their vagueness or current polemical nature would have distracted from the crux of the matter. 
To this end, to avoid any form of misunderstanding, only the two essential criteria for the theory 
being drawn here are highlighted in their name. Their meaning will be as follows. 
The basis on which to understand nativism here is ‘the desire to return to, or restore, indigenous 
practices, beliefs, and cultural forms inhibited, destroyed, or outlawed by a colonizing power’ 
(Buchanan, 2010). The parties discussed here are not simply anti-immigration, but opposed to the 
immigrant as a symbol of loss of sovereignty and/or identity, and the agent of an invasive stratagem 
aimed at the displacement and/or replacement of the autochthonous population by either a new 
culture/civilisation or a multicultural mix whereby the original population would be defiled or 
destroyed. Such parties usually rely on a Manichean and demagogic type of discourse (often 
confused with populism) within which the immigrant’s presence is rendered anxiogenic, leading to a 
loss of traditional ‘comfort’, be it in employment, social benefits, culture or identity. Their value to 
society is either omitted or downplayed, while their negative impact is exaggerated and 
essentialised: immigrants represent an alien mass, rendered faceless, to prevent any form of 
sympathy which would be natural to most. Their background, personality and/or aptitudes are 
replaced by a deformed, unidentifiable and united threat. They are dehumanised – they hold no 
individual names, no personal history, no subjective attributes. In most cases, nativist rhetoric is 
based on a sophisticated form of exclusion referred to as new or neo-racism, cultural racism or 
cultural differentialism (Taguieff, 1994; Barker, 1982; Balibar, 1997). No longer are differences based 
on altogether rejected biological superiority or inferiority. Instead, they are couched in the 
                                                          
1 For definitions of terms such as extreme right and radical right see Mondon (2013). 
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vocabulary of difference and the necessity of cultures to be kept separate if they are to thrive, and 
indeed survive. 
As Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis (2014: 120-121) have highlighted, a study of parties 
such as Greece’s SYRIZA, but also the FN and UKIP, ‘cannot be adequately discussed and no 
consistent ‘verdict’ can be reached without a clear formulation of criteria, without, that is to say, a 
rigorous theory of populism’. Contrary to the argument of scholars such as Paul Taggart (2000), 
Ernesto Laclau (2005) and the so-called ‘Essex school’ have argued that populism cannot be 
considered as an ideology, as this would ‘involve differentiating the [populist] attribute from other 
characterizations at the same defining level, such as ‘fascist’, ‘liberal’, ‘communist’, etc’. Finding a 
‘pure’ populist ideology is thus almost impossible as it would in most cases be linked to other 
ideologies.2 Instead, populism is to be found ‘in a particular mode of articulation of whatever social, 
political or ideological contents’ (Laclau, 2005: 34). For Yves Surel (2003: 127), populism is ‘a 
dimension of the discursive and normative register adopted by political actors’, ‘a set of resources 
available to a plurality of actors, in a more or less systematic way’. Populism as a category or as an 
ideology, be it a ‘thin’ one (Mudde, 2007), is therefore problematic, something this article hopes to 
render clearer as it seeks the misinterpretations of the term and their consequences. Here, populism 
is understood as a tool akin to a political synecdoche: the populist creates the people from his or her 
understanding of what ‘the people’ should be, want and/or represent. Therefore, the only element 
common to all populists is the creation of a democratic phoenix rising from its ashes: the ‘people’.  
In what has been termed the ‘post-democratic’ context (Mair, 2006), populism has proved a valuable 
tool to many ideologies. In post-modern technocratic and globally interconnected societies, the 
concept of the ‘people’ has seen its relevance fade as a driver within the decision-making process. 
With the political powerlessness of the utmost symbol of democracy, be it perceived or real, the 
populist is allowed to gain ground and offer their electorate a simplistic answer, a voice, a return to 
fantasised and glorified ‘good old days’ where popular sovereignty prevailed. However, it is crucial to 
restate that no ideological precondition is required to exploit and occupy this democratic gap. All 
that is needed is a convincing account of what the ‘people’ represent, attached to whatever ideology 
the populist is faithful to. The ‘people’ can therefore be defined in totally opposite and contradictory 
ways: all that matters is the creation of the group with vaguely defined, and often fluid, borders, 
allowing for the inclusion and exclusion of groups considered simplistically, although not necessarily 
wrongly, noxious to democracy. In this case, populism’s value to democracy or society is not fixed, 
and can be both negative and positive.  
Crises, PNPs and the media effect: a perfect storm? 
In the current political, social and historical context, it has been widely argued in the media and elite 
discourse that right-wing parties outside of the mainstream are benefiting from near optimum 
conditions leading to so-called ‘populist waves’ washing over every corner of Europe. However, such 
claims have been vastly exaggerated and the disproportionate coverage of the impending disaster 
might have led to a self-fulfilling prophecy. In their appeal to those most anxious within our 
                                                          
2 The exceptions to this may be the short-lived Narodnichestvo movement that emerged in Russia in the late 
nineteenth century and the American populist movement of the same period. However, they were hardly 
coherent movements, and their ideological distinctiveness, particularly in the American case, is often difficult 
to sustain. See Kazin (1995). 
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societies, these parties have been greatly aided by constant and severely unbalanced media 
coverage. As Aristotle Kallis (2013: 236) has noted, ‘the social and political influence of populist ideas 
on immigration and Islam in contemporary Europe is strikingly disproportionate to the actual levels 
of the far-right parties’ electoral support’. While the media is rarely sympathetic to the cause of 
what we call here populist nativist parties,3 their excessive coverage reinforces their status as both 
legitimate and the ‘real’ alternative to the status quo, the ‘outsider’ in opposition to the elite (Ansari 
and Hafez, 2012; Ellinas, 2010). Bos et al.’s study (2011: 197) confirmed the importance of the media 
for PNPs, noting that ‘when party leaders receive a large amount of attention, their party and its 
message are taken seriously […] Hence, if voters want to influence the political game, voting for 
these parties is rational and will not lead to a lost vote’. This kind of coverage and legitimisation have 
been particularly striking in France and the United Kingdom, where Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage 
have become regular features on prime time television and front pages. In France, the coverage of 
the 2014 local elections commonly referred to the ‘shock’ caused by the Front National’s 
performance, with the media being accused of playing the FN’s game (Kissane, 31 May 2014). This 
continuous and hyperbolic coverage was in spite of some relatively ordinary results compared to 
previous elections, which demonstrated, if anything, the inability of the FN to grow convincingly in a 
favourable context (see table 3). This contrasted the much-advertised ‘normalisation’ of the party 
under Marine Le Pen’s leadership leading to its ‘irresistible’ rise. The coverage of the elections also 
rarely took into account that the FN was unable to put forward more candidates and win more seats, 
despite careful targeting, demonstrating further the limits of the party’s reach. Similarly, Nigel 
Farage and UKIP have attracted ‘historically unprecedented levels of coverage for a minor party’ 
(Goodwin and Ford, 11 November 2013), and the exaggerated reaction to council election results in 
particular suggested a different story than a cold-headed analysis suggests.  
The role of the media in the making and unmaking of PNPs is not new in either country, or in Europe 
in general. In France, the misguided opportunism of the Parti Socialiste in 1984 played a part in the 
rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN (Faux et al., 1994). In the UK, the coverage of the BNP’s media stunts 
and the essentialisation of the Other – be it asylum seekers or Muslims – by the tabloid press in 
particular facilitated the rise of the party and the acceptance of nativist ideas (Renton, 2005: 28;36; 
Matthews and Brown, 2012). While the coverage of both Jean-Marie Le Pen and Nick Griffin was 
hostile, this offered the leaders of parties whose platform had been marginalised the opportunity to 
stand as the outsiders, vocal opponents of the establishment – in contrast to other alternatives given 
little or no coverage (Johnson and Goodman, 2013; Akkerman, 2011). This in turn paved the way for 
a more amenable reception of leaders whose persona and discourse appeared more moderate. The 
coverage of Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage has thus been much more favourable, even though it 
remains mostly disapproving.4 In contrast to the extremism of their populist nativist predecessors 
                                                          
3 For example, Libération’s front page after the first round of the local elections carried the headline ‘fear over 
our towns’ (‘peur sur les villes’). 
4 However, negative coverage can be positive in the long run and can in fact participate in the normalisation of 
the party if the negative element targeted is referred to as ‘an accident’, as is commonly the case with racist 
comments from party members. Often, such ‘incidents’ are twisted to benefit the far right as the focus is 
quickly moved from the shocking comment or event (often an overtly racist one), to the reaction of party 
leaders – be it the denunciation of the incident or the minimisation of the impact – instead of a scrutiny of the 
damage done. For two examples amongst many, see Le Monde and AFP (08 June 2014), and Mason (20 
September 2013). In both cases, the parties are allowed to give their own account of the event and deflect the 
seriousness of the ‘accusations’, rather than face external scrutiny. On many other occasions, the 
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and competitors on the extreme right side of politics, both were able to claim they incarnate a new 
form of ‘patriotic’ politics. This was in turn greatly aided by the lack of historical or theoretical 
analysis of their (and their parties’) ideological trajectories in much prominent public commentary, 
as analysis has relied increasingly on survey analysis. 
Partly through this mediatisation, PNPs have benefited from the normalisation of much of their 
discourse and rhetoric in the twenty-first century: what would have been considered racist and 
unacceptable at the elite discourse level twenty years ago has now become political ‘common sense’ 
(Mondon, 2013). Immigration has been used by government parties and opposition alike to explain 
the levels of dissatisfaction of the ‘people’ with politics, and both sides of the political spectrum have 
attempted to outdo each other in anti-immigration rhetoric, policies and politics. The results of the 
Eurobarometer survey in Autumn 2013 (European Commission, December 2013) clearly highlight the 
impact of the hype around immigration issues and PNPs more broadly (see table 4). When asked 
what the two most important issues facing the EU were, 16 per cent answered immigration, which 
was the 4th most cited issue on average. When asked the same question about their own country, 
immigration as a central issue fell in most cases, with the notable exception of the UK (12 per cent 
on average, 6th out of 13 issues). When asked the two most important issues they were facing 
personally, the contrast is staggering, with immigration falling to 3 per cent on average, to the 12th 
‘most important’ issue. The more European citizens considered their daily lives, the less immigration 
seemed prominent as an issue in comparison to inflation, unemployment, the economic situation of 
their country, taxation and so on. Similarly, when asked what the EU meant to them personally, ‘not 
enough control at external borders’ came tenth and ‘loss of our cultural identity’ thirteenth. While 
an overwhelming majority of the European ‘people’ (above 80 per cent) can be argued in view of this 
poll to not want what PNPs primarily offer (even in the more negative UK, where 23 per cent think 
immigration is one of the top two issues), the actions of their representatives and the media have 
implied that this is what should preoccupy them. While politicians, commentators and the media will 
not tell people what to think, they will influence what they think about, thereby potentially imposing 
what they should feel is most important (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).5 For Ruth Wodak (2013: 26), the 
pattern is clear: 
Currently, in all European countries, there is considerable evidence of a normalisation of – 
even explicit – ‘othering’ in political discourse in the public sphere, and there is much to 
indicate that this is occurring at all levels of society, ranging from the media, political parties 
and institutions to everyday life interactions. 
 
Yet the media’s skewed coverage and the process of normalisation could seem justified by the 
context in which recent elections have taken place in Europe. At first sight, it does appear that many 
conditions have united to create fertile soil for populist nativist alternatives to thrive across Europe. 
Amongst others, the economic situation has often been considered a favourable element for PNPs as 
mainstream parties on both the left and right embrace painful austerity measures (Perrineau, 2014: 
107-114; Eatwell, 2003: 56-57; Hainsworth, 2008: 85-89). While there are signs of recovery, many 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘perpetrators’ themselves are given ample media opportunities to defend themselves and claim that they are 
not racist/sexist/homophobic, leaving analysis in the background. 
5 For Dunaway et al., ‘even when an issue is not a daily and immediate concern, constant media attention 
primes issue awareness by making it more accessible in the mind or by increasing the issue’s perceived 
importance’ Dunaway, Branton and Abrajano (2010). 
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countries are still suffering from the aftermath of the economic crisis, and mid- to long-term 
forecasts are no cause for optimism. In late 2013, in contrast to early signs of economic recovery 
publicised by governments, 50 per cent of respondents in the Eurobarometer survey felt that the 
worst was still to come, and 68 per cent that the current situation in their country was bad, as many 
failed to see a bettering of their economic condition (European Commission, December 2013). In 
such a context, an exclusionary nationalistic alternative would logically appeal to some of those 
anxious about their present situation. However, as pointed out by Cas Mudde (22 August 2013), 
‘despite all the talk of the rise of the far right as a consequence of the Great Recession, the sober 
fact is that far right parties have gained support in only eleven of the twenty-eight EU member 
states, and increased their support substantially in a mere five’. While it is too early to assess the 
precise impact of the crisis on public opinion and whether there has been a move towards more 
authoritarian forms of politics, Mudde’s assessment is an important caveat against an all too 
common assessment of the situation. 
Another popular reason to explain the rise of PNPs has been the democratic crisis or crisis of 
representation, as the demand for alternative parties is considered as particularly potent in times of 
deep political distrust (Perrineau, 2014: 159-171; Eatwell, 2003: 51-52; Hainsworth, 2008: 24-28). 
According to the May 2014 Eurobarometer report (European Commission, May 2014), Europe 
continues to experience high levels of disillusionment with only 17 per cent of Europeans declaring 
they trust their political parties. While regional and local authorities fare better, the levels of trust 
remain low and often below 50 per cent. This disconnect, even at the local level, was exemplified in 
the 2014 French local elections which logged a record level of abstention. Therefore, it would not be 
illogical for parties usually marginalised and/or kept out of power to fare well in such circumstances 
– particularly thanks to their populist discourse pitting them against the loathed elite. This is usually 
exacerbated in second-order elections where the Eurosceptic side, whether opportunistic or 
ideological (Startin and Krouwel, 2013), is able to run ‘easy’ negative campaigns, attacking 
institutions which are poorly-known by the general public, and generate little interest one way or 
another as they seem removed from most people’s day-to-day lives.  
In short, the convergence of potentially favourable factors such as disproportionate media coverage, 
the apparent combination of an economic and political crisis and the ongoing process of 
normalisation of their discourse should lead in all logic to the rise of PNPs, as is predicted by much of 
the media and pundits. However, while their electoral results have to be taken seriously, and in 
some cases have pointed to disquieting trends, the overall picture suggests that on the whole they 
have failed to become the alternative to a much-loathed system (see table 2). In fact, we could argue 
that they are very much included in the distrusted options which are presented to the ‘people’, who 
prefer instead to find refuge in abstention. The question therefore is not whether PNPs are the 
solution to the democratic deficit, but instead whether they are ‘merely’ one of the symptoms of a 
broader and deeper democratic malaise.  
PNPs as a symptom of a deeper malaise 
Margaret Canovan’s early take on the rise of populism in the late twentieth century has been 
extremely influential in the study of PNPs (Canovan, 1981; Canovan, 1999). In line with the argument 
drawn here, Canovan described ‘populism’ as a style and a ‘mood’ rather than an ideology. The 
populist style refers to the ‘simplicity’, ‘directness’ and ‘honesty’ of the discourse employed by the 
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populist, in contrast with the ‘bureaucratic jargon’ of a conspiratorial elite, giving the former an aura 
of democratic ordinariness and righteousness. Emotions, often expressed through the words of a 
charismatic leader, are another inherent part of populism. However, this style alone is not enough to 
sway the ‘people’; to be effective, a populist push must take place in a precise political context. For 
Canovan, populism only thrives when democracy can no longer sustain the innate tension between 
its redemptive and pragmatic sides. It is these ‘opposed’ yet ‘interdependent’ faces which create the 
opening within which populism is allowed to appear. Populism will then arise whenever the 
technocratic side (institutions, rules, laws) and the ideal side (direct, popular sovereignty) of 
democracy have become too far apart and the cold pragmatic side of democracy no longer satisfies 
the romantic redemptive side. The gap between the ‘grubby business of politics’ and haloed 
democracy has allowed for populists to move into the vacant territory and to offer the dream of 
purer democracy. Wishing for a pragmatic democracy, as the ‘post-Marxists’ or ‘post-modernists’ 
have done, is useless since the redemptive part of democracy is vital to its existence. For Canovan, 
this redemptive characteristic has condemned democracy to having populism as its inseparable 
companion. For Hans-Georg Betz (2004: 166), the vote for the ‘populist right’ represents a vote of 
protest against and warning to the ‘established parties which have to either evolve in the desired 
direction or take the risk of losing more votes to the radical right’. This situation has arisen because 
‘it is commonly known that hostility towards external groups is very pronounced in parts of society 
with a low level of education’, but also because of ‘the identification to the nation, authoritarianism 
and political disaffection’ present in these groups (Betz, 2004: 166). While Canovan’s and Betz’s 
frameworks have played a major part in improving our understanding of populism and the populist 
right, they fail in their own ways to take into account the limits of liberal democracy and the protest 
that has taken place within and without, against what has increasingly uncovered a deepening crisis 
in the liberal democratic model itself – in its economic workings, but more importantly here in its 
political and democratic legitimacy. In the post-democratic context, it is therefore crucial not to 
misinterpret or simplify the populist push: the rise of PNPs should not be viewed as positive, 
‘constructive’ or ‘corrective’, but as an indication of the state of western democracies at the 
beginning of the third millennium. 
Adding to this skewed diagnosis of populism, the hype around right-wing populism in Europe has 
played a key part in a dual legitimisation and delegitimisation process, which has had a dramatic 
impact on politics (see table 5). With the rise of PNPs, right-wing populism has become increasingly 
portrayed as the true wish of the ‘people’, that irrational mass which turns to authoritarian solutions 
in times of crisis (be it political, civilisational, economic, real or perceived). This understanding is in 
fact reminiscent of Gustave Le Bon’s (1963) theories on the crowd, and Edward Bernays’ (2007) 
political use of propaganda as a necessary tool for democratic subjugation. As a logical yet perverse 
development, PNPs have acquired a legitimacy which they had been denied since the end of the 
Second World War when classified under the terms ‘extreme right’, ‘radical right’ or ‘far right’. As 
Annie Collovald (2004) highlighted, the populist classification is not only ‘blurrier, but also less 
stigmatizing than the ones it is meant to replace, such as fascism or extreme right’.  While their 
electoral and popular support actually remains marginal, the discursive link created between the 
‘people’ and PNPs through the term ‘populist’ has helped transform the themes they defend into 
popular demands. This has in turn legitimised their nativist and exclusionary ideals, as they become 
so-called popular and democratic demands through the skewed interpretation of the rise of the 
populist right.  
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Along with the process of legitimisation of the parties and their ideas, a concurrent process of 
delegitimisation has occurred with regard to the concept of the ‘people’. Beyond its potential as a 
legitimiser of PNPs, populism has been used by the social and political elite to imply the 
ungovernability of democracies (Rancière, 2005). The rise of PNPs has become the perfect excuse to 
explain the inability of mainstream parties to gather consequent and consistent support during 
elections: the ‘people’ and their irrational and irresponsible behaviour are to blame for the rise of 
‘extreme’ parties. While the use of populism to describe PNPs has lessened the stigma which had 
marginalised them for decades, the creation of a link – albeit a semantic one – between such parties 
and the ‘people’ has forced blame for the situation onto the latter. What appears as menacing in 
PNPs is not their ideas per se, but their role as ‘the voice of the people’. The link between the 
irrational and shameful vote for PNPs and the people in general, through the term ‘populism’, has 
allowed the governing elite to feel more secure in their endeavour: ‘if the people have become more 
authoritarian and reactionary, it is because of their own ignorance and naivety’ (Collovald, 2004: 74-
75), not because those who are meant to represent the people have failed in their task. In turn, this 
has justified that the sole purpose of elections is increasingly seen as the transfer of approval to 
those who are judged – or judge themselves – qualified to lead the people, leaving the demos with 
no choice or power (cratos).  
This understanding of the populist vote strengthens a tendency towards democratic repression 
when alternatives are sought outside of the current hegemonic order, be it on the left or right. For 
Chantal Mouffe (2005: 51), it is ‘the lack of an effective democratic debate about possible 
alternatives that has led in many countries to the success of political parties claiming to be the ‘voice 
of the people’’. What is criticised here is the apparent unanimity in the state of politics, elsewhere 
described as the ‘politics of consensus’ (Rancière, 2005). Popular sovereignty – the democratic 
symbol par excellence – has now been superseded by the values of the market and is ‘usually seen as 
an obsolete idea, often perceived as an obstacle to the implementation of human rights’ (Mouffe, 
2005: 52). In western democracies, human rights have been commonly used to claim that the 
‘democratic’ system works for the general good, beyond partisan factions: with human rights as the 
product of liberalism, the system is above all suspicion (Meister, 2011).6 This absence of antagonism 
in politics nowadays and the rejection of this so-called final stage of history by a vast portion of the 
population have been central to the appearance of right-wing populism, but also to other 
alternatives to the mainstream. For Rancière (2005: 88), the term populism becomes the weapon 
against all the ‘forms of secession from the dominating consensus’ whether they are democratic, 
racially or religiously fanatic: 
Populism is the convenient name under which is hidden the exacerbated contradiction 
between popular legitimacy and savant legitimacy, the difficulty of the government of 
science to accommodate the manifestation of democracy and even the mixed form of its 
representative system. [Populism] hides and reveals at the same time the great wish of 
oligarchy: to govern without people, which is to say without a divided people; to govern 
without politics.  
                                                          
6 Surel and Mény have also noted that the ‘constitutionalist dimension of democracy [has become] so 
developed that some believe it jeopardises the very existence of democracy itself – that is people’s democracy’ 
Mény and Surel (2002).   
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Rethinking the democratic crisis – abstention and ‘the part which has no 
part’ 
Yet populist outbursts only represent part of the democratic crisis. The lack of choice and the 
absence of a voice for those who do not feel heard in the current system – ‘the part which has no 
part’ (Rancière, 1995) – have also led to many switching off from the liberal democratic process. 
While the reasons behind abstention are many and it is impossible to generalise its meaning, its 
current record level and the widespread dissatisfaction with the workings of liberal democracy point 
to the possibility of a political voice within the growing ranks of abstainers; one which has appeared 
mostly muted in the current political debate.7 In March 2014, when asked whether ‘on the whole’, 
they are ‘very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way 
democracy works in [their country]’, 49 per cent of Eurobarometer respondents expressed a degree 
of dissatisfaction (European Commission, May 2014). While such results fluctuate between 
countries, and while dissatisfaction rests on various elements and degrees (electoral system or 
deeper resentment), this response demonstrates that despite the hegemonic understanding of 
democracy and the apparent impossibility of alternatives to the current system, a consequent part 
of the population refrains from joining the fold.  
Those most likely to be distrustful of representative democracy and abstain are to be found in the 
lower classes of society, often denounced in the media as the main pool of PNP voters.8 While a 
large part of the vote for PNPs indeed comes from the working class (broadly defined), the extent to 
which it has revealed a shift from the left to the far right has often been exaggerated or simplified 
(see amongst others Perrineau, 2014; Ford and Goodwin, 18 April 2014). Describing PNPs as 
‘workers’ parties’ rests on the dual ignorance of the history of the working class and the 
contemporary form of abstention. First, the working class in both France and the UK has never been 
monolithic, and a large part has always been attracted to the right – at its most, ‘only’ 70 per cent of 
the working class voted for the left in France (Gougou, 2014; see also Mayer, 2014). Similarly, in the 
UK, between 1974 and 2010, polls have suggested that between a quarter and a third of unskilled 
workers sided with the Conservatives (Ipsos Mori, 2010). This historically right-wing element of the 
working class has been ignored by the media, which has at the same time downplayed the rise in 
abstention in the same sectors of society. While this legitimised PNPs further, it obscured the 
withdrawal of the traditionally left-wing working class who have suffered what François Miquet-
Marty (2011: 24) has called a ‘feeling of democratic exclusion’. While those who grew up in the post-
democratic era were more likely to turn to PNPs, this feeling has led for the most part to abstention. 
In the 2009 European elections, manual workers (64.1 per cent), the unemployed (72 per cent) and 
those who positioned themselves the lowest on the social ladder (66.8 per cent) were most likely to 
have abstained – something which was left out in much of the media’s coverage of the ‘rise’ of PNPs 
in the working-class vote (European Parliament, November 2012). 
The aim here is not to ‘count’ abstention and label it a righteous ‘majority’ against PNPs, nor is it to 
imply that it necessarily carries a message. Yet, as Ron Hirschbein notes in the US case, while it is 
                                                          
7 Anne Muxel (2007) stresses rightly that abstention is not mere apathy as it regroups both those who, by 
opting out of voting, opt out of politics as whole, and those who opt out of voting as a political act.  
8 For Muxel (2007), they are part of the first group of abstainers who accept their exclusion from politics and 
the political, because of their individual situation, but also for a feeling of incompetence. However, they hold a 
deeper resentment towards society as it is. 
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difficult to find a single reason behind abstention, what is clear is that, increasingly, ‘voting is no 
longer an effective placebo for democratic self-governance’ (Hirschbein, 1999: 2; see also Norris, 
2011). This disconnect with the electoral process by those in most need of change demonstrates 
their real or perceived powerlessness in what is commonly referred to as the democratic process. 
Further, the negative manner in which abstention is treated today is a potent symbol of the illusion 
of democracy commonly accepted as natural and immovable.9 Even though abstention is less 
stigmatised than in the past, its study in the media and academia remains couched in negative terms 
(Barbet, 2007). For Rancière (1995: 34), elections are simply not a synonym for democracy; 
something which is reinforced by Mair’s (2006: 25) assessment that ‘even semi-sovereignty appears 
to be slipping away, and the citizens are becoming effectively non-sovereign’. In this illusion of 
democracy, PNPs are thus masquerading and masqueraded as the ‘voice of the people’, the sham 
embodiment of the part of those who have no part. This illusion of politics in the existence of a 
much reviled alternative allows the hegemonic elite to reject the possibility of a political or 
democratic discussion as it ‘confirms’ the irrationality of the masses. 
 
                                                          
9 Abstainers are often considered as lazy, bad citizens, disrespectful of the rights so painfully gained by our 
ancestors etc. In 2002, Pippa Norris described voting as ‘the lifeblood of representative democracy’, 
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